Pilot service for Yubikey two-factor authentication

December 12, 2014

Towards two-factor Yubikey authentication with OpenSSH

Filed under: Pilot service for Yubikey two-factor authentication — idurkacz @ 5:21 pm
Tags: , ,

Our overall strategy for a test OpenSSH service using two-factor authentication via Yubikey is now clear:

  1. Integrate Yubico’s PAM module into the PAM stack used for our ssh service.
  2. Configure that PAM module to authenticate against the Yubicloud service.
  3. Organize our configuration so that only those users who are registered (somehow …) for Yubikey use are required to submit a Yubikey OTP.

Since we definitely don’t want to mandate Yubikey use for every user, how can we arrange this final (very necessary) requirement? It turns out that the (previously unknown to me) pam_succeed_if module can help. That allows an ‘if test’ which tests for group and/or netgroup membership to be arranged in the PAM stack. So, what we need to do is to instantiate a suitable group (or netgroup) which contains the UUNs of all those users registered for Yubikey use.

To keep things as simple as possible for testing, we’ve chosen to set that up for now as a group, called yubikeyusers. (We’ll almost certainly use a netgroup in any final live implementation.) The relevant lines of the resulting PAM configuration are as follows:

auth	[success=ignore ignore=ignore default=1]	/lib64/security/pam_succeed_if.so	debug user ingroup yubikeyusers 
auth	required	/lib64/security/pam_yubico.so	id=<secret> key=<secret> authfile=/etc/yubikey_mappings debug 

Some notes about the parameters to the Yubico PAM module pam_yubico.so:

  1. We’ve got debugging turned on for this module so that we can get detailed output from the authentication process. For that to work as expected, it’s necessary to ‘touch’ the nominated log file in advance:
    touch /var/run/pam-debug.log
    chmod go+w /var/run/pam-debug.log
  2. The <secret> strings are our private keys for use with the Yubicloud service. Such keys are freely available from Yubico.
  3. The file /etc/yubikey_mappings contains the mappings of Yubikey public ids to local UUNs. That is: it formally associates actual Yubikeys with actual users. (An individual user can be associated with more than one Yubikey, by the way.) In a final live system, we’d expect to integrate that same information into our LDAP directory: Yubico’s PAM module can read from that.

Yubikey authentication

Filed under: Pilot service for Yubikey two-factor authentication — idurkacz @ 5:04 pm
Tags: ,

The Yubikey authentication standard is proprietary – but it is completely open. So it would be perfectly possible for anybody to implement their own authenticator from the ground up.

However: why bother? Yubico makes a lot of source code available at its github site including:

  1. Source code for an authentication server.
  2. Source code for a PAM module which interfaces with the authentication server.

In addition, Yubico provides a free ‘cloud-based’ authentication service, ‘Yubicloud’.

So in fact experimenting with Yubikey authentication is easy: for a start, anyway, we can just use the ‘Yubicloud’ service.

What is a Yubikey, and how does it work?

Filed under: Pilot service for Yubikey two-factor authentication — idurkacz @ 3:56 pm

A Yubikey is a small (about 3cm x 1cm x 2mm) passive USB device. When plugged into the USB port of any PC, it presents itself as a standard USB HID keyboard and, when the capacitive ‘button’ on the Yubikey is pressed, the device emits a character string which implements a one-time password (OTP).

Ignoring, for now, the details of the contents of the string, the point is that, if the string can be correctly handled as a OTP by the receiving server, the entire system is platform independent (more-or-less every PC or laptop has a USB port), and very easy to use.

Ok – so what does the ‘string’ look like? In fact, the Yubikey can operate in two different modes: either the standard proprietary ‘Yubico OTP’ mode, or ‘OATH-HOTP’ mode. (Aside: note, not ‘OATH-TOTP’: the Yubikey is unpowered, and so doesn’t have a on-board clock.) We’re currently using and testing the standard mode, though it might be that later on we move to OATH-HOTP for reasons of server-side compatability with software OTP producers.

In standard mode, then, and using its default settings, the Yubikey produces a 44 character text string in which the first 12 characters are a public id string, and the final 32 characters are an AES-encrypted OTP. Here (taken from the Yubikey manual) is an example of the output when a Yubikey is pressed three times in succession:

<-12 chars-><---------- 32 chars ---------->

You can see that the public id of the Yubikey here is fifjgjgkhchb.

What’s the content of the encrypted OTP? In essence, it’s nothing more than a monotonically-increasing integer. Authentication works as follows:

  1. Each Yubikey has a unique (symmetric) AES key.
  2. All such keys are shared between the Yubikeys, and the authentication server.
  3. On the authentication server, the AES keys are mapped to the public ids of the Yubikeys.
  4. On receipt of an OTP, the authentication server selects the appropriate AES key, decrypts the payload and, if it finds that the integer contained in the payload is larger than any previously presented by the Yubikey, authentication succeeds.
« Previous Page

Theme: Rubric.